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International Climate Policy: Trumping Trump 
in  brief   
1. Introduction: The importance of the Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement was the result of lengthy negotiations following the failure of the 2009 Copen-
hagen Climate Summit and, to a large extent, takes the special requirements of the US into account 
– not least in its focus on voluntary agreements by the individual countries (known as Nationally 
Determined Contributions, NDCs). In Barack Obama’s fi rst term as President, the US ended many 
years of obstruction and, in his second term from 2013, even became a driver of global climate policy.2  
And so, it is somewhat ironic and tragic that the US is now withdrawing from this agreement.
Background
On the afternoon of 1 June 2017, US President Donald Trump announced in the White 
House Rose Garden that he wanted to withdraw from the 2015 Paris Agreement.1  
What does this step by the United States mean for global climate protection? This 
in brief examines how those countries that are interested in protecting the climate can 
best come together to successfully carry forward the Paris Agreement and global 
climate policy. 
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Might the international community succeed in not just compensating for the American contribution, 
but also in seizing the momentum that has arisen following the decision by the US? In the end, the 
World Community might thus even defy Trump through more far-reaching measures.3  The initial 
reactions of the international community were unequivocal. Clear declarations from former “brake-
men” such as China and India that they would adhere to their commitments were of particular note. 
And the G20 summit in Hamburg in July 2017 confi rmed this assessment. In the unprecedented 
act of isolating a single country, the remaining “G19” states (i.e. excluding the US) rea  rmed their 
commitment to the Paris Agreement, stating it as being “irreversible”.4
In assessing these reactions, it is to be noted that, with the Paris Agreement, climate policy was pre-
sumably granted the highest priority international issues can actually be given. If the announcement 
of a withdrawal from an international treaty is equated worldwide to moral bankruptcy; if in the 
fi nal declaration of a G20 summit, 19 states a  rm their support for the Paris Agreement in opposi-
tion to the US; and if this isolation could potentially even lead to a restructuring of the geopolitical 
arena, then this is indeed a global issue of the highest priority. In this sense, the withdrawal by the 
US could in fact have catapulted climate policy into a position its signifi cance merits, because it con-
cerns the basis of our civilisation’s continued existence.
2.  The future of national climate protection policy in the US and its importance 
for global climate protection
Immediately after Donald Trump took o  ce, a new energy plan, the “America First Energy Plan”, 
was published on the White House website. According to this, “harmful and unnecessary” policies, 
such as Obama’s “Climate Action Plan” would have to be eliminated, the extraction of shale oil and 
gas using fracking embraced and the coal industry revived. Whether the latter is possible, however, 
is seriously doubted even by companies in the coal industry. Not least because the high level of com-
petition from unconventional natural gas and the sharp fall in prices for renewable energies present 
major reasons for the decline in coal mining.
Despite this radical turnaround, the fate of the energy transformation in the United States has not 
yet been sealed, because energy policy in the US is chiefl y the responsibility of the individual federal 
states, and the President has no formal infl uence on their legislative processes. In many progressive 
states, there are ambitious climate protection laws and, as was already the case during George W. Bush’s 
presidency, the policies of the national administration have resulted in a strong counter-reaction 
from subnational and non-governmental stakeholders.
Immediately after the US President announced the withdrawal, 9 federal states, 125 cities, 900 
companies and investors as well as 183 universities published the “We are still in” declaration, 
in which they each confi rm their willingness to implement the Paris Agreement even without the 
national government. Furthermore, 13 governors, both Democratic and Republican, formed a “US 
Climate Alliance”, and ten other governors published individual declarations in support of the Paris 
Agreement. Moreover, it is highly signifi cant that China struck a deal with California to increase 
cooperation and trade in clean technologies just a few days after the announcement in the Rose 
Garden. The agreement was signed by Governor of California Jerry Brown and Chinese President 
Xi Jinping. This event was absolutely unprecedented, because China had never before entered into 
direct agreements with subnational authorities.
1 Assessments of Trump‘s statements can be found on the website of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMUB) http://www.
bmub.bund.de/themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz/internationale-klimapolitik/pariser-abkommen/faktencheck/ and that of Germanwatch: 
http://germanwatch.org/de/13976.
2 Cf. Obergassel et al. 2015/2016.
3 See Hermwille/Obergassel 2016 for a discussion of the withdrawal procedure and possible scenarios.
4 The central statement of the G20 summit can be found at https://www.g20.org/gipfeldokumente/G20-leaders-declaration.pdf.
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The former Mayor of New York, Michael Bloomberg, announced his intention to o  cially submit 
the reductions in emissions projected and quantifi ed by individual initiatives to the United Nations 
as ”America‘s Pledge”, thus representing the American contribution to emissions reduction.
Nevertheless, the U-turn of the Trump administration on climate and energy policy and the con-
sequent return to the prioritisation of coal, oil and gas will slow down the reduction of energy-re-
lated greenhouse gas emissions. Such an energy policy will also further consolidate the so-called
carbon lock-in e ect: existing and newly emerging path dependencies would make the subse-
quent conversion to a renewable energy system more di  cult. Furthermore, the impact of the new 
US policy extends beyond US borders: it may result in other countries also slackening their e orts 
or at least not increasing them further. But despite all of this, one thing is of paramount importan-
ce: a departure from previous energy policy will not stop further price reductions and technologi-
cal developments in the fi eld of renewable energies, energy e  ciency and storage technologies.
What impact will these changes in the US have on global warming? Most of the scenarios conside-
red in the last report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assume that 
the 2°C limit will only be achieved by implementing a very quick turnaround regarding global 
emissions. Therefore, the end of US climate protection policy does indeed pose a threat to compli-
ance with the 2°C not to speak of the 1.5°C limit. According to the Climate Action Tracker calcula-
tions, the national measures to be implemented after Donald Trump‘s election will, however, not 
result in an increase but rather a stabilisation of the current US emissions owing to the develop-
ments outlined above.5  In light of the US share of around one-sixth of global greenhouse gas 
emissions, this is also inadequate and worrying. However, the Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement would have required improvement even without the 
withdrawal of the United States. The next round of negotiations from 2018 will thus provide an 
opportunity not only to oset the loss of the US but also to more than compensate for this.
3. Strategies for climate policy despite Trump
For the future of the international process, a lot depends on how much energy the President himself 
and his administration are prepared to invest in this subject. After refusing to ratify the Kyoto Proto-
col, George Bush Jr initiated several international agreements that were in part expressly conceived 
as competing arrangements, such as the Asia Pacifi c Partnership Agreement (APP). How China, the 
EU and other major countries respond to the end of American climate policy to date will, however, 
still be more decisive for the future of the negotiation process.
In the months and years ahead, one of the main tasks for the countries interested in climate protec-
tion will be to form a strong alliance in order to isolate the United States. Politically, the greatest 
responsibility lies with the EU as the only power with the resources and infl uence necessary to fi ll 
the vacuum – especially in the fi nancial sphere. Only the EU has the economic weight to ensure that 
intelligent rules prevent stringent climate policy from failing in the face of competition concerns, 
especially if the clear collaboration seen to date with the People’s Republic of China continues.
The G20 summit in Hamburg on 7/8 July 2017 was the acid test at the highest level. In the run-up 
the summit host, Germany, announced that climate policy would take a prominent position on the 
summit agenda, and climate policy was indeed the last and most di  cult point to be addressed. 
Remarkably, the US was isolated in the joint declaration by the remaining 19 countries, as was also 
successfully done at the recent meeting of the G7 Environment Ministers. 
5 See Action by China and India slows emissions growth, President Trump’s policies likely to cause US emissions to fl atten. 
http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/briefi ng_papers/CAT_2017-05-15_Briefi ng_India-China-USA.pdf.
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In addition to this, agreement was also reached by the G20 on a detailed „Climate and Energy 
Action Plan“ – a strong indication of the strength and resilience of the Paris Agreement. During 
the negotiations, however, President Trump did ensure the inclusion of a clear indication of his 
future course in the declaration, namely that the US wants to discontinue the contribution to 
climate protection it promised in Paris with immediate e ect. The announcement to work closely 
with other countries in order to make more e  cient use of fossil fuels can also be seen as an indi-
cation that the US wants to develop alternative forums to the climate regime.
In addition to the G7 and G20 processes and a large number of established international insti-
tutions, there are essentially two levels available for the further development of the global 
climate agenda, which are discussed separately in the following. On the one hand, there are the 
activities within the context of the global climate regime, i.e. the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. If a large-scale policy of 
obstruction by the US and other stakeholders should lead to problems, climate protection can, 
however, be further promoted outside of these agreements.
Strategies within the climate regime
First of all, all members of an international treaty must act in compliance with the rules. Under 
international law, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties even stipulates that the 
object and purpose of the treaty may not be defeated. As long as the US is party to the Paris Agree-
ment, it must abide by the rules stipulated. As US membership in the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change is not being terminated, this will continue to apply even after the e ective date of its 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, i.e. after 4 November 2020.
However, a contracting state can neither be forced to contribute towards a positive further develop-
ment nor be stopped from blocking it. Because Saudi Arabia and other countries have blocked the 
adoption of majority decisions in the rules of procedure since 1994, the US has every opportunity to 
obstruct policy on the basis of the prevailing consensus principle. Since the Paris Agreement leaves 
many important details open, it essentially comes down to further contractual arrangements. In 
particular, the adoption of rules for the so-called ‘transparency framework’ is urgently required. As 
there is no real compliance procedure for monitoring fulfi lment of the treaty, a process of naming 
and shaming is supposed to encourage the states to turn their words into deeds.6 In the event that it 
takes an obstructive approach, the US could block this process or the adoption of a procedure.
Even if the US administration were not to actively work against clear transparency rules, this would 
still pose one of the greatest political challenges. After all, under Barack Obama, the US was a major 
driver of strict transparency rules. Without it performing this function, this equilibrium in the ne-
gotiations could be lost. In the worst-case scenario, the transparency framework could end up being 
an instrument that is not worthy of the name due to weak implementation rules. This would make 
it much more di  cult or even impossible to monitor actual progress and hold countries that do not 
e ectively pursue their own climate protection targets to account.
If an alliance of countries ambitious to further develop the Agreement were to be established, 
it may face a refusal to cooperate on the part of the US at an early stage. This would be harmless, as 
long as there is no active resistance – silence is seen as consensus. In the case of an obstruction, the 
perseverance of a progressive alliance would have to be proven early on. In order to make “coalitions 
of pioneers” possible, it would be a good idea to seek changes to the procedures and institutions at 
an early stage.
6 Cf. Obergassel et al. 2015/2016.
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7 The members of the Umbrella Group other than the USA are Australia, Canada, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia and Ukraine.
8 http://www.v-20.org/
The following building blocks of a strategy may be useful in this context:
 
  Sanctioning destructive behaviour. If the US takes an actively destructive stance, the 
other states should isolate it as much as possible. This could, for example, be done 
by refusing to allow the US to chair committees and working groups. In addition to 
this, the members of the Umbrella Group, which includes the US, could withdraw their 
cooperation.7  Following the announcement by the US of its refusal to pay two billion 
dollars to the Green Climate Fund, its membership on the board of the fund could also 
be called into question.
  Initiative to strengthen the structure of the Paris Agreement. Lying at the heart of the 
Paris Agreement, in addition to the promised voluntary contributions, are the trans-
parency framework, i.e. the review of what the states are actually doing, and the call 
for these contributions to be increased every fi ve years. The states are currently called 
upon to submit new or increased contributions by 2020. A coalition of the ambitious 
states should therefore push for the establishment of a strong transparency and com-
pliance mechanism and intensify their own climate protection ambitions in order to at 
least partially compensate for the withdrawal of the US. The ambitious states should 
also use the momentum of the current outrage regarding the US President’s withdraw-
al and strive to have the 1994 draft rules of procedure adopted, as these include the 
option of majority decisions.
  Initiative for climate fi nancing. The Green Climate Fund is the main fi nancing instru-
ment of international climate policy. Donald Trump announced that all fi nancial contri-
butions from the United States would stop. Since former President Obama already paid 
USD 1 billion of the USD 3 billion promised by 2020, USD 2 billion remains outstanding. 
Because of this, a declaration by as many countries as possible to o set these funds 
insofar as possible would be important and essential for the formation and cohesion 
of an ambitious alliance. In this context, collaboration with the Vulnerable 20 Group, a 
group of fi nance ministers from vulnerable countries8 that cooperate closely, would be 
helpful.
  Greater involvement of subnational and non-governmental stakeholders. In the last 
few years, there have been a growing number of initiatives by cities, regions, enterpris-
es and civil society stakeholders who want to advance climate protection. The climate 
regime could be strengthened through greater involvement of such stakeholders. The 
Paris Agreement explicitly recognises the role of transnational initiatives and climate 
protection measures by entities. However, there have been hardly any opportunities 
to date for such stakeholders to join in the diplomatic process. Through an initiative 
designed to supplement the Paris Agreement, the progressive US federal states could 
thus be allowed to get involved, to make a contribution to the Paris Agreement and to 
cooperate with other (nation) states.
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Strategies outside the climate regime 
The international treaties and agreements of the climate regime, namely the Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, are not conclusive regu-
lations that would prevent other diplomatic or legal activities. As long as the obligations arising 
from these treaties are not a ected and new activities are not contrary to the spirit and purpose 
of these treaties, they are permitted. A great number of climate-protection measures are taken in 
forums outside of ”climate policy”, for example by the multilateral development banks and food or 
air tra  c organisations. Within these forums, climate protection can and should be prioritised by 
progressive states, also and in particular as a counterpoint to US e orts to impede climate protec-
tion. In recent years, there have also been a number of parallel activities in the narrower fi eld of 
climate policy, for example the foundation of the ”Climate Vulnerable Forum” involving almost 
fi fty countries that will be particularly a ected by the threat of climate change.9
Several possibilities for coordinated action may be considered:
 
  A pioneer club of ambitious states and subnational stakeholders. In the event of the 
US (and some of its allies) preventing the further development of the Paris Agreement, 
the ambitious states could create a separate, parallel forum. Such a “Multi-Speed Cli-
mate Policy”10 has not really been an option to date with regard to the Paris Agreement. 
However, if the US does in fact actively obstruct the process or if the international com-
munity is only prepared to agree on minimal compromises in response to the US’s new 
priorities, a pioneer alliance of ambitious states would be the only option remaining for 
serious international cooperation in the fi eld of climate protection. Such a decarbonisa-
tion club could link ambitious goals with binding obligations on a contractual basis and 
decide upon cooperation on the basis of law and equity.
  Supplementary agreements on climate protection for specifi c sectors. In view of a 
possible US policy of obstructionism within the Paris Agreement, the formation of pio-
neer alliances for specifi c issues could be useful, for example regarding adaptation or 
the sustainable use of biomass. A pioneer alliance for carbon pricing mechanisms could 
advance the application of climate-related taxes or emissions trading systems, neither 
of which can be agreed on a global level in the foreseeable future and thus require a 
coalition of pioneers.11 Actively shaping structural change in the countries and regions 
that depend heavily on the production and the use of fossil energy sources is also a 
matter of urgency. If controlled changes to these economic structures are delayed, 
sooner or later this will lead to a structural break, which will presumably be much more 
painful.
  Development of trade measures. If the US does actually prevent any progress with-
in the context of the Paris Agreement, even more drastic measures are possible. In a 
new treaty, for example, rules for dealing with states not party to the treaty could be 
agreed. An example of this is the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, which prohibits trade in ozone-depleting substances with countries that 
are not party to the Protocol. In the past, so-called carbon border tax adjustments were 
discussed in relation to climate protection, i.e. import duties that were to refl ect the 
carbon footprint of imported goods. So far, there has been little political support for 
such measures, which have instead been seen as harmful to world trade. This attitude 
could change, however, if Trump were to terminate international trade agreements as 
promised in his election campaign and adopt protective tari s to support domestic 
industry. If the new US President were to engage in a trade war and if confl icts were to 
escalate in other political fi elds, approaches to border tax adjustments for the purposes 
of climate protection would, at the very least, no longer be entirely unthinkable.
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6. Conclusion
US President Trump‘s announcement of his withdrawal from the Paris Agreement represents a 
massive step backwards in international climate diplomacy. In a bizarre turn of events, this hap-
pened just as the global community provided a still-inadequate but nevertheless universally accepted 
framework for the fi ght against ecological crises by adopting the Climate Agreement in 2015 and the 
Sustainable Development Goals for 2030. The refusal by the United States to support an ecologi-
cally and socially just world could cause the global consensus to fall apart – but this does not have to 
happen. To avoid this situation, however, signifi cant political, economic and fi nancial e orts will be 
required from all ambitious states.
In order to achieve this, certain myths will have to be dispelled. Firstly, the mistaken assumption 
that, without the United States, no e ective climate protection is possible, which would mean 
that its involvement is a make-or-break issue. This conviction has shaped global climate diplomacy 
decisively over the past 25 years – and slowed it down. Of course, at some point the US will also have 
to contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to zero. But anyone who makes participation 
by the US (or China) a prerequisite for all others is robbing themselves of any possible success. Any 
country aiming to make progress must be prepared to make the fi rst move itself, regardless of wheth-
er or not everyone else joins in.
Irrespective of climate protection, this is generally advantageous for the pioneer countries when the 
additional benefi ts often associated with climate protection measures are taken into account. 
Improved air quality, reduced energy import dependency and additional employment incen-
tives are just three examples. Furthermore, potential pioneer alliances are now facing very di erent 
circumstances than they did just a few years ago. The strategies of relevance to climate protection, 
especially the development of renewable energies, have now become competitive due to massive 
cost reductions over the last few years – thus, there is much that speaks in favour of pursuing a 
climate protection-oriented path even for purely economic reasons. The US President, on the 
other hand, could be doing the US a disservice. By relying on energy supply structures that are no 
longer competitive, he is depriving his country of incentives for technological innovation and thus of 
signifi cant opportunities on the growing global climate protection markets.
Secondly, the myth that action can only be taken in consensus within the context of the UN has to be 
dispelled. International law recognises a broad range of decision-making procedures, from unanimi-
ty to consensus, from two-thirds or three-quarters majorities to decisions with simple majorities. The 
most successful example of a majority-based decision process is the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, where a two-thirds majority is su  cient to change the treaty and make 
these changes binding for all the parties, including those who do not agree. In the context of inter-
national law, where there is a will there is a way. If individual states, especially the members of the 
European Union and the most vulnerable countries, are really serious about this, then they will fi ght 
for the option of majority decisions.
The American President‘s irrational policies have made it clear that the future of humanity cannot be 
allowed to depend on a single country. Therefore, it is high time for alliances of reason to be formed. 
In any case, the Nationally Determined Contributions promised to date ought to be increased. 
Without the US, a further gap has now been created, for which other states will have to – and 
absolutely can – compensate with improved policies. In this sense, Donald Trump may be the igno-
rant and unwilling tool of history who involuntarily ensures that the world will now address climate 
protection in earnest.
 9 http://www.thecvf.org/
10 Cf. Ott 2016.
11 For example, proposals in the 2016 Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition founded in Marrakech in the Report of the High Level Commission on 
Carbon Prices: https://www.carbonpricingleadership.org. See also Kraemer et al. (2017).
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